Nobel Winner: "Abort Gays"

One of the discoverers of the structure of DNA and Nobel prize winner James Watson (pictured) said a little while ago that if a gene for homosexuality were discovered, a woman should be free to abort a fetus that carried it. There are at least two issues here, if in the future the technology and the knowledge brings us to such a place. Firstly- is it ethical for parents to be able to have complete freedom to choose their child's genetic inheritance (to the extent that technology allows) Secondly- if not, should it be the role of the state to forbid such actions?
To begin I will say that I think genetic enhancement of fetuses is morally defensible. I would argue in a similar fashion to Singer  and say that genetic enhancement is an extension of what we currently consider good parenting; parenting that works to maximise a child’s abilities and opportunities for life in much the same way that good education and nutrition do. Controversial of course, but if one accepts genetic enhancement and selection processes as a valid thing for parents, does that mean Watson is right? Well I would say 'yes' and 'no'.  In the abortion or modification of a homosexual fetus to a heterosexual fetus there is no one who is harmed, unless you think a fetus is a person, which I do not. As such it is not unethical by virtue of harming an individual person. What I believe makes such an act unethical is the denigration of sexualities that are of equal moral worth. Unlike the abortion of disabled fetuses as currently practiced on quality of life considerations (and by extension permits their modification if we had the technology) aborting homosexual fetuses would be based solely on the perceived moral worth of homosexuality, i.e. it is of less moral worth than heterosexuality. 
But where does that leave us? Should the state intervene? This is Watsons' point I suppose; there are many things that we believe are unethical yet the state does not intervene. A liberal point of view. When a person is harmed we can see a strong reason for state intervention. But in this instance it seems that while it is unethical to abort homosexual fetuses, it does not warrant state intervention to prevent it. I base this on considerations of consequences. No one individual is directly harmed. In addition, what if it was illegal? Should the state force people to have gay babies? Would it be in the child's best interests to be brought into the world by a family that held such views of homosexuality? As such it would seem to me that while it is definitely immoral to make moral judgments on the value of people via reference to their sexuality and to abort/genetically modify fetuses on such a basis, the state should not prevent it from happening. And that is where Watson and I agree.

In Defence of Regrets

"Make the most of your regrets; never smother your sorrow, but tend and cherish it till it comes to have a separate and integral interest. To regret deeply is to live afresh."
Henry Thoreau

This quote by the American Transcendentalist Thoreau may seem an odd post to begin an ethics blog, but there are at least two reasons I think it is pertinent. I am quite fond of his work, that is one reason, but more importantly I want to use it to say that feelings and emotion are integral to thinking about and living ethics.
When thinking philosophically about ethics there is the danger of wanting to bar feelings and emotions from the ethical equation. This may stem from a wariness of Subjectivism or Relativism, especially if one is committed to a Universalist school of ethical thought. But if ethics is to be useful, and if it is a vehicle that can develop us as human beings and guide us in the gritty dynamic realities of existence, then any ethical perspective will be impoverished and in my mind, somewhat hollow without a robust place for, and understanding of, emotion in moral thought. Computers cannot make moral decisions, not just because ethics isn't about simple equations involving empirical facts, but because they cannot feel.
Indeed, when commenting on the classic ethical problem involving two people drowning in a pond, one of them a stranger and one of them your wife, American philosopher Franklin suggests that it would be a strange sort of person that did not go to save his wife in preference to the stranger. With love as the motivator, I want to say he should prioritise his wife, and I also want to say that this is a sound moral action. This might seem to chaf with a commitment to the moral equality of all persons.
Is there some important distinction to be made if in a similar example to the above; the husband is an emergency doctor who has two patients and only one person he can choose to save, one patient being his wife? How can we understand and configure emotion in ethical deliberation? I am not going to suggest anything here, that is something that we all have to think about. What I will do is return to my original starting point, regret. Like all emotions that we engage healthily with it can be a motivator, instigator, catalyst and intuitive guide. To smother it because it is uncomfortable, or to try and live a life without it in my mind is to eviscerate the full experience of being and the opportunities for growth it opens, and that truly is a wrong.